


Internet Applications Design and Implementation

(Lecture 5 - on Security)

MIEI - Integrated Master in Computer Science and Informatics
Specialization block

João Costa Seco (joao.seco@fct.unl.pt)

(with previous participations of Jácome Cunha (jacome@fct.unl.pt) and João Leitão (jc.leitao@fct.unl.pt),
contributions from Beatriz Moreira, APDC-INV 2017/2018)



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Software Security (Overview)

- Security is a hot topic in CS in present days!
- **Cryptography** can only protect data **outside of systems**, when properly applied and if there are no “internal” information leaks.
- **Security breaches** are often caused by internal errors that cause: system crashes or erroneous behaviour due to unexpected inputs
- **Security breaches** are often caused by programming mistakes.

Security of Applications (Overview)

- Good engineering practices and correct usage of methods and tools ensures that all specified data confidentiality rules are properly enforced.
- There are two elective courses in MIEI only about this topic.
 - Software Security: fundamental concepts and technologies
 - Network and Computer Systems Security: system-level security
- This lecture is about models and frameworks that implement software security.

Outline

- Security Concepts Review
- Foundations of Computer Security
- Security Models
- Kotlin and Spring Security
- Model-Based Access Control in Spring


Internet Applications Design and Implementation

(Lecture 5 - Part 1 - Security Concepts)

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Security of Internet Applications

- Layers of internet application security
 - Network Level (network security and system identification)
 - System Level (firewalls, VPNs, SSL, DMZ)
 - Application Level (our focus)
 - Authentication
 - Access control
 - Information flow



The Big Picture - Organisation Industry Standards (ISO 27002)


- Definition of General Security policies
 - Organization of information security
 - Asset management
 - Human resources security
 - Physical and environmental security
 - Communications and operations management
 - Access control (data, operations, and other resources)
 - Acquisition, development, and maintenance of Software Systems
 - Incident management
 - Compliance with regulations
- 
- About software**

Security Policies in Software Systems


- within an software system:
 - “The set of restrictions and properties that specify how a computing system prevents information and computing resources from being used to violate an organizational security policy” in Computer Security, Dieter Gollmann 2011
- Policies define who has permission to access or operate on, a given resource.
 - Access control lists,
 - firewall settings,
 - services that may be run on user devices,
 - security protocols for protecting network traffic,
 - ...

Attacks and Attackers

- Security can be defined and challenged based on the definition of attacks and attackers. What does an attacker know and what operations can they perform on a system.
- The correct functioning of a system is based on assumptions on the environment.
- Attacks are designed to challenge system assumptions with illegal inputs, causing illegal states, erroneous behaviour or crashes.



Classic Example: SQL injection



Classic Example: SQL injection

User Name:

Password:

```
uName = getRequestString("username");  
uPass = getRequestString("userpassword");
```

```
sql = 'SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name =' +  
      uName + ' ' AND Pass =' ' + uPass + ' ';
```

Result

```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name ="" or ""="" AND Pass ="" or ""=""
```


Security flaws in software



OWASP Top 10 - 2017

The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risks

OWASP Top 10 - 2017

A1:2017-Injection

A2:2017-Broken Authentication

A3:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure

2017

- A01:2017-Injection
- A02:2017-Broken Authentication
- A03:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure
- A04:2017-XML External Entities (XXE)
- A05:2017-Broken Access Control
- A06:2017-Security Misconfiguration
- A07:2017-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- A08:2017-Insecure Deserialization
- A09:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
- A10:2017-Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

2021

- A01:2021-Broken Access Control
- A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures
- A03:2021-Injection
- (New) A04:2021-Insecure Design
- A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration
- A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components
- A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures
- (New) A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures
- A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring Failures*
- (New) A10:2021-Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)*

* From the Survey

A10:2017-Insufficient Logging&Monitoring [NEW,Comm.]

<https://owasp.org>

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<https://www.owasp.org/>

Still Up-to-D

Security flaws in software

Still Up-to-Date

- **A01:2021-Broken Access Control** moves up from the fifth position; 94% of applications were tested for some form of broken access control. The 34 Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) mapped to Broken Access Control had more occurrences in applications than any other category.
- **A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures** shifts up one position to #2, previously known as Sensitive Data Exposure, which was broad symptom rather than a root cause. The renewed focus here is on failures related to cryptography which often leads to sensitive data exposure or system compromise.
- **A03:2021-Injection** slides down to the third position. 94% of the applications were tested for some form of injection, and the 33 CWEs mapped into this category have the second most occurrences in applications. Cross-site Scripting is now part of this category in this edition.
- **A04:2021-Insecure Design** is a new category for 2021, with a focus on risks related to design flaws. If we genuinely want to “move left” as an industry, it calls for more use of threat modeling, secure design patterns and principles, and reference architectures.
- **A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration** moves up from #6 in the previous edition; 90% of applications were tested for some form of misconfiguration. With more shifts into highly configurable software, it’s not surprising to see this category move up. The former category for XML External Entities (XXE) is now part of this category.
- **A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components** was previously titled Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities and is #2 in the Top 10 community survey, but also had enough data to make the Top 10 via data analysis. This category moves up from #9 in 2017 and is a known issue that we struggle to test and assess risk. It is the only category not to have any Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVEs) mapped to the included CWEs, so a default exploit and impact weights of 5.0 are factored into their scores.
- **A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures** was previously Broken Authentication and is sliding down from the second position, and now includes CWEs that are more related to identification failures. This category is still an integral part of the Top 10, but the increased availability of standardized frameworks



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tdated Components
Authentication Failures
Integrity Failures
nd Monitoring Failures*
it Forgery (SSRF)*

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org/

In a nutshell

Most common attacks are at the application level and can be avoided by properly using well tested and tested frameworks and well established methods.

Internet Applications Design and Implementation

(Lecture 5 - Part 2 - Foundations)

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Foundations of Computer Security

- Fundamental Properties:
 - **confidentiality** - prevention of unauthorised disclosure of information,
 - **integrity** - prevention of unauthorised modification of information,
 - **availability** - prevention of unauthorised withholding of information or resources
 - ... more... accountability; non-repudiation; reliability/dependability; ...

“Computer security deals with the prevention and detection of unauthorized actions by users of a computer system” - Dieter Gollmann,

[See also the wikipedia page](#)

Foundations of Software Security

- Main concepts used in software security
 - **Principal** (the active subject)
 - **Resource** (the passive object)
 - **Authentication** - the principal provides proof that they are who they say they are
 - **Authorisation** - the principal is trusted to access or perform an operation on a resource
 - **Delegation** - can you operate on behalf of other principal?
- Declassification operations in confidentiality analysis
- Endorsement operations in integrity analysis

Principal/Authentication



- An authenticated entity (or group) that uses the system
- The active subject on system operations
- **Authentication:**
 - The certification process of determining the identity of an external entity that uses the system, invokes actions, produces and consumes data.

Resource/Authorisation

- The process of checking what resources a principal is allowed to access and manipulate, and what operations is it allowed to execute at a given time and system state (data, parameters, context, etc.).
- **Authorisation** (to observe or change)
 - read, execute, write, append, delete, change access, change ownership, ...
 - Classic access control models
 - Access Control Matrix
 - Capabilities
 - Access Control Lists


Authorisation and access control models

- Base models
 - Access Control Matrix; Capabilities; Access Control Lists
- Intermediate control structures
 - Groups and negative permissions



Authorisation and access control models

- Base models
 - Access Control Matrix; Capabilities; Access Control Lists
- Intermediate control structures
 - Role-based access control
 - Principal
 - Roles
 - Permissions
 - Operations
 - Resources




Internet Applications Design and Implementation

(Lecture 5 - Part 3 - Security Models)

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
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Security Models

- Access Control List
- Capability-based access control
- Role-based access control
- Bell–LaPadula model for confidentiality
- Biba Integrity model for data integrity
- Model-based access control

Access Control Lists

- ACLs are lists of permissions (identity, operation) attached to objects stored within the system.
- It must explicitly assign individual identities to operations on resources.
- Spring Security ACL implements ACL on top of explicitly managed database tables



```
@PostFilter("hasPermission(filterObject, 'READ')")
List<NoticeMessage> findAll();

@PostAuthorize("hasPermission(returnObject, 'READ')")
NoticeMessage findById(Integer id);

@PreAuthorize("hasPermission(#noticeMessage, 'WRITE')")
NoticeMessage save(@Param("noticeMessage") NoticeMessage noticeMessage);
```

<https://www.baeldung.com/spring-security-acl>

Capability-based access control


- A decentralised method that provides a scalable approach to access control
 - No need for centralised access control lists and mechanisms;
- A capability refers to an object and a set of rights, the user that owns it can perform the operation described in the capability
 - Example: a pair (“/etc/pass”, O_RDWR) gives readwrite access
- Common in micro-service based architectures and IoT scenarios

Capability-based access control

- A capability is transmitted through unforgeable (and ephemeral) tokens
- Capabilities can be explicitly and dynamically managed
 - Good support for authorisation and delegation
- To perform an operation on a particular object, the principal has first to acquire the associated capability via some dynamic authorisation method.

Role-Base Access Control

- Standard approach to authorise users to perform operations in software systems.
 - Roles are specified for system related tasks
 - Permissions are assigned to specific roles
 - Users are dynamically assigned roles according to their profile/function



<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c3/RBAC.jpg>

Role-Base Access Control

- Standard approach to authorise users to perform operations in software systems.
 - Roles are specified for system related tasks
 - Permissions are assigned to specific roles
 - Users are dynamically assigned roles according to their context
- **Roles can also be combined in hierarchies or lattices**
- **Delegation can be integrated in the general model**
- **RBAC provides a framework for a verification based on interceptors and filters**
- **Roles can also be parameterised and depend on actual data.**

Operation

<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c3/RBAC.jpg>

Bell–LaPadula model - Confidentiality

- Formalises the U.S. Department of Defense multilevel security policies.
- The security level of a subject is compared to the classification of the object (and the security compartment where it is stored)
- The access control rules state that:
 - A subject cannot read up
 - A subject cannot write down
 - + an access control matrix

TOP SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PUBLIC

No Write Down
No Read Up

Information Flow Control - Confidentiality

- The process of ensuring that data is only seen by trusted principals. This involves assigning a level of trust to data and principals.
- General technique to check it is called **information flow control**
- **Declassification**: The process of lowering the level of trust needed to access a given data item.

```
var high = 1  
var low = ... 10 + high ...
```

```
var low = 2  
if ( high > 0 ) low else 3
```

Operating
Systems

R.S. Gaines
Editor

**A Lattice Model of
Secure Information
Flow**

Dorothy E. Denning
Purdue University

Biba Integrity model - Data Integrity

- Data integrity has three goals:
 - Prevent data modification by unauthorised principals
 - Prevent unauthorised data modification by authorised principals
 - Maintain internal and external data consistency
- The access control rules state that:
 - A subject cannot read up
 - A subject cannot write down
 - + an access control matrix

TOP SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PUBLIC

No Read Down
No Write Up

Information Flow Control - Data Integrity

- The process of ensuring that data is only provided by trusted principals.
- Also an information flow control property (dual of confidentiality)
- **Endorsement**: the process of increasing the level of trust o a given data item.

```
var untrusted = 1  
var trusted = ... 10 + untrusted ...
```

```
var trusted = 2  
if ( untrusted > 0 ) trusted else 3
```

Operating
Systems

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**A Lattice Model of
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Dorothy E. Denning
Purdue University

**Hybrid Information Flow Control for Low-level
Code**

Eduardo Geraldo¹, José Frago Santos², and João Costa Seco¹

¹ NOVA LINES - NOVA University Lisbon, Portugal

² Instituto Superior Técnico & INESC-ID, Portugal

SNIFFER: Information Flow Aware Test Generation for SNITCH*

Abstract

Verifying security properties in Software Systems is a cumbersome and painful task. Despite sophisticated techniques for detecting information leaks, such as information flow aware static type systems and runtime reference monitors, the actual adoption in real code is not significant. Relevant factors include the conservative character of the static analysis tools and the impractical need for many test cases, taking into account the subtleties of data security

1 Introduction

Testing is the *de facto* industrial method used for validating software and detecting programming mistakes in software systems. Unfortunately, the trend for increasingly larger systems leads to ever-increasing codebases, harder to test and maintain. Rapidly expanding codebases, and the pervasiveness of critical systems, make it almost impossible to manually design test cases in a timely fashion. Automatic test generation is a promising alternative for

Model-Based Access Control

- Security conditions are many times hidden in query filters and program conditions. These policies are very difficult to get right, maintain, and modify.
- Developer-defined roles usually depend on the current state of the application. (e.g. ModeratorOf(...)). Role-based models usually ignore this and require the application logic to validate it.
- Example: authorisations usually depend on the state of the target entity (status == “submitted”)
- Capabilities defined by the developer can extend the standard read/write/delete (not hardwired to the basic programming elements)

Type-based Access Control in Data-Centric Systems


Luís Caires¹, Jorge A. Pérez¹, João C. Seco¹, Hugo T. Vieira¹, and Lúcio Ferrão²

¹ CITI and Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa

² OutSystems SA

Data-centric multi-user systems, such as web applications, require flexible yet fine-grained data security mechanisms. Such mechanisms are usually enforced by a specially crafted security layer, which adds extra complexity and often leads to error prone coding, easily causing severe security breaches. In this paper, we introduce a programming language approach for enforcing access control policies to data in data-centric programs by static typing. Our development is based on the general concept of refinement type, but extended so as to address realistic and challenging scenarios of permission-based data security, in which policies dynamically depend on the database state, and flexible

Model-Based Access Control



(19) **United States**

(12) **Patent Application Publication**
Ferrão et al.

(10) **Pub. No.: US 2013/0246995 A1**

(43) **Pub. Date: Sep. 19, 2013**

(54) **SYSTEMS, METHODS, AND APPARATUS FOR MODEL-BASED SECURITY CONTROL**

(75) **Inventors:** Lúcio Emanuel Represas Ferrão, Lisboa (PT); João Ricardo Viegas da Costa Seco, Cascais (PT); Luís Manuel Marques da Costa Caires, Lisboa (PT); Gonçalo Filipe Xavier Caleira Borrega, Alcabideche (PT); António Augusto Vieira Melo, Lisboa (PT)

(73) **Assignee:** OutSystems - Software em Rede S.A., Linda-A-Velha (PT)

(21) **Appl. No.:** 13/418,922


(22) **Filed:** Mar. 13, 2012

Publication Classification

(51) **Int. Cl.**
G06F 9/44 (2006.01)
G06F 9/45 (2006.01)

(52) **U.S. Cl.**
USPC 717/104

(57) **ABSTRACT**
An integrated model-driven application development and execution environment enables declaration of a data-role in an application model. The data-role is based on a property of a data entity in the application model. The data-role provides for the enforcement of domain-specific security policies with respect to data elements corresponding to the data entity.




Further Reading

Computer Security. Dieter Gollmann. 3rd edition. Wiley, 2011.

OWASP Testing Guide V4. Owasp foundation, 2016. <https://www.owasp.org/images/1/19/OTGv4.pdf>

- CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (A1, A6)
- Authentication, authorization, non-repudiation (A1, A2, A6)
- Risk, threats, vulnerabilities, and attack vectors (A3, A6)
- Concept of trust and trustworthiness (A4)
- Threat and attacker modelling (A3, A5, B1)
- Identification and authentication (A2, B3)
- Authorization and access control models (B2, B4, B5)
- Defensive programming (C2, D1)
- Software security testing (A5, C2, D2)
- Secure design basic principles (B2, B4, C1)
- Security best practices and standards (B3, B4, B5, B6, C2)
- Techniques for preserving security across modules and trust maintenance (A4, B1, B6, D1, D2, D3)
- Web security model (B6)
- Session management, authentication (B3, C3)
- Web application vulnerabilities and defenses (A5, B1, C3, C4)
- Client-side security (C4, D3, D4)
- Server-side security tools (C4, D3, D5)



Internet Applications Design and Implementation

(Lecture 5 - Part 4 - Using Kotlin & Spring)

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Using frameworks for security

- Frameworks such as Spring, with Spring Security project promote the reuse of (correct) code, good practices, and great number of base features.

Spring Security 5.4.1



OVERVIEW

LEARN

Spring Security is a powerful and highly customizable authentication and access-control framework. It is the de-facto standard for securing Spring-based applications.

Spring Security is a framework that focuses on providing both authentication and authorization to Java applications. Like all Spring projects, the real power of Spring Security is found in how easily it can be extended to meet custom requirements

<https://spring.io/projects/spring-security>

Using frameworks for security

- Frameworks such as Spring Security promote the reuse of (correct) code, good practices, and great number of base features.
 - HTTP BASIC authentication headers (an IETF RFC-based standard)
 - HTTP Digest authentication headers (an IETF RFC-based standard)
 - HTTP X.509 client certificate exchange (an IETF RFC-based standard)
 - LDAP (a very common approach to cross-platform authentication needs, especially in large environments)
 - Form-based authentication (for simple user interface needs)
 - OpenID authentication
 - Authentication based on pre-established request headers (such as Computer Associates Siteminder)
 - JA-SIG Central Authentication Service (otherwise known as CAS, which is a popular open source single sign-on system)
 - Transparent authentication context propagation for Remote Method Invocation (RMI) and HttpInvoker (a Spring remoting protocol)
 - Automatic “remember me” authentication (so you can tick a box to avoid re-authentication for a predetermined period of time)
 - Anonymous authentication (allowing every unauthenticated call to automatically assume a particular security identity)
 - Run-as authentication (which is useful if one call should proceed with a different security identity)
 - Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS)
 - JEE container authentication (so you can still use Container Managed Authentication if desired)
 - Kerberos



- By just including the dependency in the application, security is automatically enabled.

```
<dependency>  
  <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>  
  <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</artifactId>  
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>  
  <groupId>org.springframework.security</groupId>  
  <artifactId>spring-security-test</artifactId>  
  <scope>test</scope>  
</dependency>
```

- Configuration is then possible by declaring basic access properties and basic user information.

<https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/>

Including Spring Security




- By just including the dependency enabled.

```
<dependency>  
  <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>  
  <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</artifactId>  
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>  
  <groupId>org.springframework.security</groupId>  
  <artifactId>spring-security-test</artifactId>  
  <scope>test</scope>  
</dependency>
```

- Configuration is then possible by declaring basic access properties and basic user information.



<https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/>

<https://spring.io/guides/topicals/spring-security-architecture>

Including Spring Security



- By just including the dependency it is enabled.

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
  <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</artifactId>
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework.security</groupId>
  <artifactId>spring-security-test</artifactId>
  <scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
```

- Configuration is then possible by declaring basic access properties and basic user information.

```
@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
class WebSecurityConfig : WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter() {
    @Throws(Exception::class)
    override fun configure(http: HttpSecurity) {
        http
            .authorizeRequests()
                .antMatchers("/") .permitAll()
                .anyRequest().authenticated()
                .and()
            .formLogin()
                .permitAll()
                .and()
            .logout()
                .permitAll()
    }

    @Bean
    public override fun userDetailsService(): UserDetailsService {
        val user: UserDetails = User.withDefaultPasswordEncoder()
            .username("user")
            .password("password")
            .roles("USER")
            .build()
        return InMemoryUserDetailsManager(user)
    }
}
```


Including Sp

- By just includ enabled.

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework
  <artifactId>spring-b
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework
  <artifactId>spring-s
  <scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
```

- Configuration by declaring properties an information.

```
@EnableWebSecurity
@Configuration
open class SecurityConfig {

    @Bean
    @Throws(Exception::class)
    open fun securityFilterChain(http: HttpSecurity,
                                authenticationManager: AuthenticationManager
    ): SecurityFilterChain {
        http.invoke {
            csrf { disable() }
            authorizeHttpRequests {
                authorize("/v3/api-docs", permitAll)
                authorize("/swagger-ui/**", permitAll)
                authorize(anyRequest, authenticated)
            }
            formLogin { }
            httpBasic { }
        }
        return http.build()
    }

    @Bean
    fun userDetailsService(): UserDetailsService {
        val userDetails = User.withDefaultPasswordEncoder()
            .username("user").password("password").roles("USER").build()
        return InMemoryUserDetailsManager(userDetails)
    }

    @Bean
    fun authenticationManager(authConfiguration: AuthenticationConfiguration): AuthenticationManager? {
        return authConfiguration.authenticationManager
    }
}
```

W/ SPRING BOOT 3

Including Sp

- By just includ enabled.

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework
  <artifactId>spring-b
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework
  <artifactId>spring-s
  <scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
```

- Configuration by declaring properties an information.

```
@EnableWebSecurity
@Configuration
open class SecurityConfig {

    @Bean
    @Throws(Exception::class)
    open fun securityFilterChain(http: HttpSecurity
```

```
) : Secu
    htt
```

```
    }
    ret
```

```
@Bean
fun use
    val
```

```
    ret
    }
```

```
@Bean
fun authenticationManager(authConfiguration: AuthenticationConfiguration): AuthenticationManager? {
    return authConfiguration.authenticationManager
}
```

```
}
```

Manager

Please sign in

Sign in

()

<https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/>

Including Spring Security



- By just including the dependencies, Spring Security is enabled.

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
  <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-security</artifactId>
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework</groupId>
  <artifactId>spring-security-test</artifactId>
  <scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
```

- Configuration is the next step, where we can configure Spring Security by declaring basic access properties and basic user information.

```
@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
class WebSecurityConfig : WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter() {

    @Bean
    fun passwordEncoder(): PasswordEncoder = BCryptPasswordEncoder()

    @Service
    class MyUserDetailsService(val users: UserService) : UserDetailsService {
        override fun loadUserByUsername(username: String?): UserDetails? =
            users.findUserById(username).map {
                User.withDefaultPasswordEncoder()
                    .username(it.username)
                    .password(it.password)
                    .roles(it.roles)
                    .build()
            }.orElse(null)
    }
}
```

<https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/>

Including Spring Security



- By just including Spring Security, authentication is enabled.

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework
  <artifactId>spring-boot-
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework
  <artifactId>spring-security
  <scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
```

- Configuration is done by declaring basic properties and login information.

```
jcs@Joaos-iMac ~ % http :8080/applications
HTTP/1.1 403
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 14:30:34 GMT
Expires: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=60
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=2454FD5814FB3EEBF80E07CF1737C10D; Path=/; HttpOnly
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: DENY
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block

{
  "error": "Forbidden",
  "message": "",
  "path": "/applications",
  "status": 403,
  "timestamp": "2020-10-19T14:30:34.051+00:00"
}
```

```
pter() {

    pagerBuilder) {

        encode("password"))

        order())
    }
}
```

<https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/>

Including Spring Security



- By just including it, Spring Security is enabled.

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework
  <artifactId>spring-boot-
</dependency>
```

```
<dependency>
  <groupId>org.springframework
  <artifactId>spring-security
  <scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
```

- Configuration is done by declaring basic properties and basic information.

```
jcs@Joaos-iMac ~ % http :8080/applications --auth user:password
HTTP/1.1 200
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 14:57:40 GMT
Expires: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=60
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=2361CEB5951A39C2967863030D2EBA48; Path=/; HttpOnly
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: DENY
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block

[]

jcs@Joaos-iMac ~ %
```

```
ter() {

    gerBuilder) {

        ncode("password"))

        der())
```

<https://spring.io/guides/gs/securing-web/>

Authentication - Simple starter code



- The default security setting provides that all requests are protected, a login form is created, RESTful interface for login/logout...

```
@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
public class SecurityConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {

    @Autowired
    public void configureGlobal(AuthenticationManagerBuilder auth) throws Exception {
        auth
            .inMemoryAuthentication()
            .withUser("user").password("password").roles("USER");
    }
}
```

Look into the documentation for the up-to-date API!!

Fundamental Concepts mapped to Spring Context



- Principal - Who is the entity behind a particular request

```
@RequestMapping("/messages/inbox")
public ModelAndView findMessagesForUser(@AuthenticationPrincipal CustomUser user) {

    // .. find messages for this user and return them ...

}
```

- Authentication: Certify that a given set of credentials identify one principal

```
@Autowired
public void configureGlobal(AuthenticationManagerBuilder auth) throws Exception {
    auth
        .jdbcAuthentication()
            .dataSource(dataSource)
            .withDefaultSchema()
            .withUser("user").password("password").roles("USER").and()
            .withUser("admin").password("password").roles("USER", "ADMIN");
}
```

Look into the documentation for the up-to-date API!!

Linking to the application model



- Dynamic verification of user credentials is part of the application model

```
override fun configure(auth: AuthenticationManagerBuilder) {  
    auth.inMemoryAuthentication()  
        .withUser( username: "user")  
        .password(BCryptPasswordEncoder().encode( rawPassword: "password"))  
        .authorities(emptyList())  
        .and()  
        .passwordEncoder(BCryptPasswordEncoder())  
        .and()  
        .userService(customUserDetails)  
}
```

Look into the documentation for the up-to-date API!!

Linking to the application model



- Dynamic verification of user credentials is part of the application model

```
override fun configure(auth: AuthenticationManagerBuilder) {  
    auth.inMemoryAuthentication()  
        .withUser( username: "  
        .password(BCryptPassw  
        .authorities(emptyLi  
        .and()  
        .passwordEncoder(BCry  
        .and()  
        .userDetailsService(  
}  
}
```

```
@Service  
class CustomUserDetailsService(  
    val users: UsersService  
) : UserDetailsService {  
  
    override fun loadUserByUsername(username: String?): UserDetails {  
  
        username?.let { it: String  
            val userDAO = users.findUser(it)  
            if( userDAO.isPresent ) {  
                return CustomUserDetails(userDAO.get().username, userDAO.get().password, mutableListOf())  
            } else  
                throw UsernameNotFoundException(username)  
        }  
        throw UsernameNotFoundException(username)  
    }  
}
```

Look into the documentation for the up-to-date API!!



- Authorisation - Check if a given principal has rights to access a given piece of information

```
protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
    http
        .authorizeRequests()
            .antMatchers("/resources/**", "/signup", "/about").permitAll()
            .antMatchers("/admin/**").hasRole("ADMIN")
            .antMatchers("/db/**").access("hasRole('ROLE_ADMIN') and hasRole('ROLE_DBA')")
            .anyRequest().authenticated()
            .and()
        // ...
        .formLogin();
}
```

- Delegation - to be able to temporarily assign one principals capabilities' to another principal (e.g. sudo)

<http://docs.spring.io/autorepo/docs/spring-security/3.2.1.RELEASE/apidocs/org/springframework/security/web/authentication/switchuser/SwitchUserFilter.html>

org.springframework.security.web.authentication.switchuser

Class SwitchUserFilter

java.lang.Object

org.springframework.web.filter.GenericFilterBean

org.springframework.security.web.authentication.switchuser.SwitchUserFilter

All Implemented Interfaces:


javax.servlet.Filter, Aware, BeanNameAware, DisposableBean, InitializingBean, Ap

Internet Applications Design and Implementation

(Lecture 5 - Part 5 - Model-based Authorisation in Spring)

MIEI - Integrated Master in Computer Science and Informatics
Specialization block

João Costa Seco (joao.seco@fct.unl.pt)




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
Model Based Access Control

- Security conditions are many times hidden in query filters and program conditions. They are very difficult to maintain/modify/get right.
- Developer defined roles usually depend on the state of the application. (e.g. ModeratorOf(...)). Role-based models ignore this.
- Authorisations usually depend on the state of the target entity (status == submitted)
- Capabilities defined by the developer extend read/write/delete (not hardwired to the basic programming elements)

Model Based Access Control



Model Based Access Control - Custom Cap.



Model Based Access Control - Spring?

```
protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {  
    http  
        .authorizeRequests()  
            .anyRequest().authenticated()  
            .and()  
            .antMatchers("/admin/hotels/{id}")  
            .access(id => managerOfHotel(id))  
            .access(id => hotels.findOne(id).isApproved())  
    //...  
}
```

Not really Spring... how could we do this?

Security and Frameworks (Spring)

- Web Development Frameworks provide basic mechanisms like:
 - Authentication
 - username, password, authorities (roles)
 - Authorization
 - hasRole, hasPermission

Role Based Access Control

- Application level pattern implemented on top of basic authentication mechanisms
 - Principal (The authenticated user)
 - Role (Job functions a user may have)
 - Capabilities (Systems operations a role may be associated with)
- Allows the dynamic assignment of capabilities to users
- Allows sophisticated assignment and delegation mechanisms (e.g. roles assigned in name of another principal, or by a limited time).

Model based security

- Security conditions are part of the application level
- Authentication and authorisation are system level

```
// POST /hotels/{id} - update the hotel with identifier {id}
@RequestMapping(value="{id}", method=RequestMethod.POST)
@PreAuthorize("hasRole('{ROLE_ADMIN,ROLE_MANAGER}')"")
public String editSave(@PathVariable("id") long id, Hotel hotel,
                      Model model, Principal principal) {
    if( principal.getName().equals(hotel.getManager().getName())) {
        hotel.setTimestamp(new Date());
        hotels.save(hotel);
        return "redirect:/hotels/"+id;
    } else
        throw new AccessDeniedException("Cannot edit hotel "+hotel.getName());
}
```

- Security conditions are many times encoded into application logic (if-else-throw statements) and where conditions in queries.

Spring Security implementation

- Basic spring security is based on SPEL expressions using principal information and parameters...

```
// POST /hotels/{id} - update the hotel with identifier {id}
@RequestMapping(value="{id}", method=RequestMethod.POST)
@PreAuthorize("hasRole({'ROLE_ADMIN','ROLE_MANAGER'}) "
              + "and principal.name == #hotel.manager.name")
public String editSave(@PathVariable("id") long id, Hotel hotel,
                      Model model, Principal principal) {
    hotel.setTimestamp(new Date());
    hotels.save(hotel);
    return "redirect:/hotels/"+id;
}
```

- Rule: “a hotel can be edited by its manager or an administrator”
 - Problem: `#hotel.manager.name` is not loaded !!

Pros & Cons

- + May use model information
- + Provides row-level authorisation on resources
- - Has limited access to the model (database)
- - Bad reuse of condition expressions
- - Runtime parsing and execution of security expressions

Policies or security rules

- Isolate the implementation of security rules in services with full access to the model.

```
@Component("mySecurityService")
public class MySecurityService {

    @Autowired
    HotelRepository hotels;

    public boolean canEditHotel(User user, long hotelId) {

        Hotel hotel = hotels.findOne(hotelId);

        return hotel != null && hotel.getManager() != null &&
            user.getUsername().equals(hotel.getManager().getName());
    }
}
```

- Model access, Good reuse, auditing of rules.

Policies or security rules in “services”

- Isolate the implementation of security rules in services with full access to the model.

```
// POST /hotels/{id} - update the hotel with identifier {id}
@RequestMapping(value="{id}", method=RequestMethod.POST)
@PreAuthorize("hasRole({'ROLE_ADMIN'}) or "
              + "@mySecurityService.canEditHotel(principal,#id)")
public String editSave(@PathVariable("id") long id, Hotel hotel,
                      Model model, Principal principal) {
    hotel.setTimestamp(new Date());
    hotels.save(hotel);
    return "redirect:/hotels/"+id;
}
```

- Model access, Good reuse, auditing of rules.

Capabilities encoded in “annotations”

- Statically identify capabilities and associated rules in annotations, associated to controllers...

```
// POST /hotels/{id}          - update the hotel with identifier {id}
@RequestMapping(value="{id}", method=RequestMethod.POST)
@AllowedForEditHotel
public String editSave(@PathVariable("id") long id, Hotel hotel, Model model) {
    hotel.setTimestamp(new Date());
    hotels.save(hotel);
    return "redirect:/hotels/"+id;
}
```


Capabilities encoded in “annotations”

```
@Target({ElementType.METHOD, ElementType.TYPE})
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@Inherited
@Documented
@PreAuthorize(AllowedForHotelCreation.Condition)
public @interface AllowedForHotelCreation {
    String Condition = "hasRole('ROLE_ADMIN')";
}

@Target({ElementType.METHOD, ElementType.TYPE})
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@Inherited
@Documented
@PreAuthorize(AllowedForEditHotel.Condition)
public @interface AllowedForEditHotel {
    String Condition = "@mySecurityService.canEditHotel(principal,#id) or "
        + AllowedForHotelCreation.Condition;
}
```

<http://blog.novoj.net/2012/03/27/combining-custom-annotations-for-securing-methods-with-spring-security/>

View authorisations

- Authorization expressions can be also used in views (with an awkward syntax, yes...)

```
<div class="container">
  <h1>Hotel <span th:text="${hotel.name}"></span></h1>
  <p th:text="${hotel.timestamp}"></p>

  <h2>Rooms</h2>
  <ul th:each="room : ${rooms}">
    <li th:text="${room.name}+ '&nbsp;' + ${room.type.description}"></li>
  </ul>

  <div sec:authorize="${#authorization.expression(T(booking.security.AllowedForEditHotel).Condition2)}">
    <p><a th:href="@{/hotels/${hotel.id}/edit}">Edit</a></p>
  </div>
  <div sec:authorize="${#authorization.expression(T(booking.security.AllowedForHotelCreation).Condition)}">
    <p><a href="/hotels/new">Add a new hotel</a></p>
  </div>
  <p><a href="/hotels">List all hotels</a></p>
</div>
```

- Binding is sometimes different and has to be adapted :(

```
String Condition = "@mySecurityService.canEditHotel(principal,#id) or "
                  + AllowedForHotelCreation.Condition;
String Condition2 = "@mySecurityService.canEditHotel(principal,#vars.hotel.id) or "
                   + AllowedForHotelCreation.Condition;
```


Pros & Cons

- + May use model information
- + Provides row-level authorisation on resources
- + Has full access to the model (database)
- + Good reuse of condition expressions (in services)
- - Runtime parsing and execution of security expressions
(only better using static verification of code)